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J. S. Mill clearly enunciated the question than stands at the beginning of any and
every scientific inquiry:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006b, p.
746)
Where and when the axiomatic method originated is uncertain. We know about it
particularly from Euclid. It is certain, however, that in economics axiomatization
commenced with Senior:
It [the axiomatic method] was introduced to economics in A.D. 1836 by
Nassau William Senior in his Outline of the Science of Political Econ-
omy and is today more or less consciously adopted by most economic
theorists as the way of theorizing in economics. (Stigum, 1991, p. 4)
Euclid’s path runs through the classical school (Halévy, 1960, p. 494), the neoclas-
sical school (Jevons, 1911, p. 21) and reached an unprecedented level of Walrasian
abstraction in the 1960s (Debreu, 1959, p. x). Whether the project of Wald, von
Neumann, Debreu, Arrow, Hahn, McKenzie, and others (Ingrao and Israel, 1990),
(Leonhard, 1995), (Weintraub, 1998) has met with success is no longer an open
question. It is plain that ‘anything based on this mock-up is unlikely to fly’ (Hahn,
1981, p. 1036), see also (Ackerman, 2004), (Kirman, 1989, p. 126). Keynes, as so
often, perspicuously articulated the challenge:
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-
Euclidean world . . . . Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw
over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry.
Something similar is required to-day in economics. (Keynes, 1973, p.
16)
The crucial point is not axiomatization per se but the choice of axioms. One cannot
not axiomatize but one can practice it imaginatively or mechanically, rigorously
or sloppily, systematically or haphazardly, precisely to the point or beside it. As
Clower put it:
My opinion continues to be that axiomatics, like every other tool of
science, is no better than its user, and not all users are skilled. (Clower,
1995, p. 308)
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The thesis to start with suggests itself: neither neoclassical nor Keynesian economics
possess a qualified axiomatic basis. Heterodox economists as complementary group
mostly rebut the ‘deductivist Euclidean methodology’, recommend a pluralistic
approach, and propose to give up the ‘Euclidean hope’ (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 52).
But from the argument that the neoclassical behavioral axioms are unqualified
does not logically follow that the axiomatic method is defective. An outstanding
proponent of axiomatization like Poincaré simply did not accept Walras’s hypotheses
of selfishness and farsightedness as axioms (Kirman, 2009, p. 82). It only follows
that some economists have not applied the method correctly, for whatever reasons
(Hudson, 2010, p. 15-16). The point at issue is the real world content of axioms.
The fact that the economy is an open system (Dow, 2010, pp. 272-274) does not on
principle prevent axiomatization.
The second thesis says: human behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method.
A behavioral axiom is a methodological oxymoron (cf. Cairnes 1875, p. v; Rosen-
berg, 1980; Hudík, 2011). Yet the axiomatization of the economy’s basic structure
is feasible. Accordingly, the first objective is to establish a formalism of maximum
structural simplicity and generality. We start with an axiom set that is free of any
behavioral specifications and subsequently approach the complexity of the real
world by a process of consistent differentiation. The differentiation of the business
sector in turn immediately leads to the question of what determines relative prices
or, as the classics put it, exchange values. The question is in the following answered
by the structural value theorem. The claim of generality entails that it should be
possible to demonstrate that selected parts of the classical and neoclassical theory
of value can be formally connected to the structural value theorem.
The consistent restatement in structural axiomatic terms of what is broadly referred
to as theory of value is the purpose of the present paper. In the first part, the logical
interdependencies of the key variables that formally embody the business and the
household sector and the markets in between are expounded. In the second part,
the real world implications with regard to the theory of value are made explicit.
The analytical starting point is given with the structural axiom set in Section 1. In
Sections 2 to 8 the structural value theorem, the profit ratio, and the rate of interest
are derived for the competitive structure. Section 9 concludes.
1 Axioms and definitions
The first three axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in a period of
arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is conveniently
assumed to be the calendar year. It can be shown that the applicability of the
axiom set does not depend on the chosen period length (for details see 2011b).
Simplicity demands that we have at first one world economy, one firm, and one
product. Quantitative and qualitative differentiation is obviously the next logical
step after having worked out the implications of the following three axioms.
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Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and total working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
A set of axioms is a tentative formal starting point. The assessment comes on the
next stage with the interpretation of the logical implications of the formal world and
the comparison with selected data and phenomena of the real world. Axioms should
have an intuitive economic interpretation (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007,
p. 25). The economic meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms.
What deserves mention is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and
distributed profit and not of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit
have to be thoroughly kept apart.
By choosing objective structural relationships as axioms behavioral hypotheses are
not ruled out. The structural axiom set is open to any behavioral assumption and
not restricted to the standard optimization calculus (for details see 2011d).
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). They add no content to the set of axioms but merely
facilitate the use of symbols. New variables are introduced with new axioms. With
(4) wage income YW and distributed profit income YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
With (5) the expenditure ratio ρE , the sales ratio ρX , the distributed profit ratio ρD,
and the factor cost ratio ρF is defined:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW ρF ≡
W
PR
|t. (5)
The axioms and definitions are consolidated to one single equation:
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ρF
ρE
ρX
(1+ρD) = 1 |t. (6)
The period core (6) as absolute formal minimum determines the interdependencies
of the measurable key ratios for each period. It asserts that the product of the
constituents which characterize the firm, the market outcome, and the income
distribution is always equal to unity. The period core is purely structural, i.e. free
of any behavioral assumptions, unit-free1 because all real and nominal dimensions
cancel out, and contingent. Contingency means that it is open until explicitly stated
which of the variables are independent and which is dependent. The form of (6)
precludes any notion of causality; it states that the interdependence of the key ratios
is subject to a ‘conservation law’ (cf. Mirowski, 1988, p. 3).
The factor cost ratio ρF summarizes the internal conditions of the firm. A value of
ρF < 1 signifies that the real wage WP is lower than the productivity R or, in other
words, that unit wage costs WR are lower than the price P or, in still other words,
that the value of output per hour PR exceeds the value of input W . In this case the
profit per unit is positive. Then we have the conditions in the product market. An
expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures C are equal to
income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced. A value
of ρX = 1 of the sales ratio means that the quantities produced O and sold X are
equal in period t or, in other words, that the product market is cleared. In the special
case ρE = 1 and ρX = 1 with budget balancing and market clearing the factor cost
ratio ρF and with it the profit per unit is determined solely by the distributed profit
ratio ρD. The period core (6) covers the key ratios about the firm, the market, and
the income distribution and determines their interdependencies. The period core
represents the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment expenditures, no
foreign trade, and no taxes or any other state activity.
2 The structural value theorem (I)
The axioms and definitions have first to be differentiated for two firms. This formal
exercise is referred to the Appendix. For the relative prices of two products then
follows directly from (52) in combination with (44):
PA
PB
=
RB
RA
LB
LA
CA
CB
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (7)
If the markets for both products are cleared the price ratio is inversely proportional
to the ratio of productivities and the ratio of labor inputs and directly proportional to
1 “This procedure is in accordance with the principle of objectivity requiring that the whole theory
and its interpretations have to be independent of the choice of the units of measurement. And
this requirement is met, if the theory is unit-free, the necessary condition stated in Buckingham’s
P-theorem.” (Schmiechen, 2009, p. 176)
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the ratio of the consumption expenditures for the two products. This implies a soft
budget constraint, that is, the sum of consumption expenditures CA +CB needs in
the general case not be equal to income Y . For the special case of budget balancing
C = Y , i.e. ρEA +ρEB = 1, it follows from (7):
PA
PB
=
OB
OA
1
1
ρEA
−1
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (8)
Relative prices are equal to the inverse relation of the outputs of both firms multiplied
with a factor that depends on the expenditure ratio for product A which is now
complementary to the expenditure ratio for product B. For the special case with
total expenditures divided equally between the two products, i.e. ρEA = 0.5, relative
prices are simply equal to the inverse relation of the outputs. Or, as commonplace
economics always had it (Niehans, 1994, p. 15), the relatively abundant product
is cheap and the relatively scarce product is dear. If, on the other hand, outputs
are numerically equal, then the relative price of product A varies directly with the
expenditure ratio ρEA.
Relative prices depend according to (8) on the objective ratio of outputs, i.e. on
supply, and on the subjective partitioning of consumption expenditures, i.e. on
demand.
Since we have from the standard theory of consumer demand the marginalistic
behavioral condition that the marginal rate of substitution MRS be equal to the
price ratio we are in the position to synthesize the structural formalism and the
marginalistic behavioral assumption. From the definition of the expenditure ratio
(5) follows:
ρEA
ρEB
=
CA
Y
CB
Y
=
PAXA
PBXB
|t. (9)
When, by applying the rule MRS = PAPB , the optimal quantities XA, XB are determined
in the usual way as coordinates of the tangential point of budget constraint and in-
difference map then the optimal partitioning of consumption expenditures ρEA, ρEB
is also determined. This implies that any configuration of expenditure ratios can be
formalized as a consumer optimum.
A straightforward result materializes as significant limiting case if the labor inputs
of the two firms stand in the same proportion as the expenditures for both products:
PA
PB
=
RB
RA
if
LA
LB
=
ρEA
ρEB
and if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t.
(10)
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If labor input is allocated according to the consumers’ preferences, which are
revealed by their expenditure ratios (cf. Marshall, 2009, p. 13), then relative prices
are inversely proportional to the productivities in the two lines of production. Budget
balancing is not required. Neither are speculations about the shape of a hypothetical
production function required. The productivities in period t are measurable. We
refer to this configuration as the competitive structure.
Now we define the exchange ratio as quotient of market clearing prices and the
transformation ratio as quotient of productivities:
ρP ≡ PAPB and ρR ≡
RA
RB
units of B
unit of A
←
C
unit of A
C
unit of B
and
units of A
unit of B
←
units of A
h
units of B
h
(11)
The exchange ratio is different from the price relation with regard to the dimension
but has the same numerical value. The exchange ratio is the real counterpart
of relative prices. In a strictly real analysis only exchange ratios are admissible.
Likewise for the transformation ratio. In real terms (10) boils down to:
ρP =
1
ρR
|t. (12)
In the competitive structure the exchange ratio is inverse to the transformation
ratio. This is the most elementary form of the objective relation between exchange
and production. This real structural value theorem is entirely free of subjective
connotations.
Let us summarize before we take profit into the picture. As a general structural
result, which follows directly from the axioms, one has for relative prices:
PA
PB
=
XB
XA
CA
CB
|t. (13)
Expressed in ratios the structural value theorem takes these forms:
ρP =
ρXB ρEA
ρXA ρEB ρL ρR
(i) =
ρEA
ρEB ρL ρR
(ii) =
1
ρR
(iii) |t. (14)
Real economies will most probably be found between market clearing (ii) and
the competitive structure (iii). In the competitive structure solely organiza-
tion/technology stands in relation to relative prices respectively the exchange rate.
Neither pleasure and pain, nor utility maximization and profit maximization play a
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role in this state. Whether the budget is balanced or not is a matter of indifference.
Obviously, it does not follow from the axiom set that this state is ‘natural’ and that
the economy ‘gravitates’ towards it. This idea was an article of faith among the
classics. Open to debate were only the nature of profit and the relation between
natural price and the natural rates of wages, profit, and rent (Dobb, 1973, p. 44).
3 Formal touch points
The purely deductive result of (10) coincides with ‘a doctrine of the utmost impor-
tance in political economy’ (Ricardo, 1981, p. 13), according to which ‘it is natural
that what is usually the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be worth
double of what is usually the produce of one day’s or one hour’s labour’ (Smith,
2008, p 45). There is an alternative formulation of (10) that in combination with (2)
formally embodies Adam Smith’s proposition:
PA
PB
=
L?A
L?B
with L?A =
LA
OA
=
1
RA
|t. (15)
The structural axiom set implies as a limiting case that relative prices are equal to
the ratio of labor inputs per unit of the respective output (cf. Niehans, 1994, p. 89;
Dmitriev, 1986, p. 81; Blaug, 1998, p. 110). In addition it implies the refutation of
Jevons’s sweeping critique of the classics. Jevons announced a new era of economic
thinking by arguing that authority, i.e. Smith, Ricardo and J. S. Mill, had been on
the wrong side and explained the nature of value by ‘infinitely small amounts of
pleasure and pain’ (Jevons, 1911, p. vii). But since the subjective partitioning of
consumption expenditures can always be expressed in marginalistic terms there is
no contradiction between the ‘Jevonian Law of Diminishing Utility’ (Dobb, 1973,
p. 109) and the classical labour theory of value in its most elementary form. In the
competitive structure of the pure consumption economy the three value theories
(classical, neoclassical, structural axiomatic) fall formally into one.
There is, of course, much more to classical and neoclassical value theory. The former
is a substance theory the latter a field theory. The implications of these different
conceptions have been elaborated at length by Mirowski (1995). Establishing the
formal touch point with the labour theory of value does not entail that the more
philosophical idea that value is created by labor is adopted (for Marx’s theory of
surplus value see 2011a).
4 Profit ratio equalization
In the structural axiomatic context the business sector’s profit in period t is given
with (16) as the difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole
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identical with consumption expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage
income YW :2
Q f i ≡C−YW |t. (16)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical with
that of the theory of the firm:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL |t. (17)
By applying the 1st axiom and the definitions (4) and (5) one arrives at:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD or Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t. (18)
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes the profit ratio ρQ is defined with (19) and
this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelation of the profit ratio, the
expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ Q f iYW ⇒ ρQ ≡ ρE (1+ρD)−1 |t. (19)
The overall profit ratio is positive if the expenditure ratio ρE is > 1 or the distributed
profit ratio ρD is > 0, or both. The determinants of profit look essentially different
depending on the perspective. For the firm price P, quantity X , wage rate W , and
employment L in (17) seem to be all important; under the broader perspective of
(18), which is formally equivalent, these variables play no role at all. The profit
definition provokes a cognitive dissonance between the micro and the macro view
that shall be dealt with in Section 6.
The first question is how profits are distributed between the two firms. The financial
profit for each firm is given by:
Q f iA ≡ PAXA−WALA
Q f iB ≡ PBXB−WBLB |t. (20)
Applying (3) and (2) one gets for relative profits in the competitive structure:
Q f iA
Q f iB
=
1−
WA
PARA
1− WB
PBRB
CACB if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (21)
2 Profits from changes in the value of financial and nonfinancial assets are neglected here. One
member of the latter class is the stock of products which may change with regard to quantity and
valuation price if the product market is not cleared in successive periods. This case is here excluded
by the condition ρX = 1.
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If the wage rates in the different lines of production are equal the numerical value in
the brackets is one under the condition of (10) and the ratio of profits is equal to the
ratio of consumption expenditures for the two products.
Equation (21) presupposes that the wage rate for all employees, i.e. inclusive
management and executives, is equal. This is normally not so; hence W has to be
taken as average wage rate that is given by:
WA ≡WA1 LA1LA + . . .+WAi
LAi
LA
+ . . .+WAn
LAn
LA
|t. (22)
From the purely formal standpoint it suffices that the average wage rates WA and
WB are equal. It is obvious, however, that the differentiation of wage rates within
a firm affects the partitioning of consumption expenditures if the individual ex-
penditure ratios of different employees are different. To keep things simple, this
interdependency between the distribution of wage rates within each firm and the
partitioning of consumption expenditures between the two firms is ruled out with
the assumption that the average expenditure ratios for both firms are, for the time
being, independent from the distribution of wages within the firms.
For the comparison of firms with different size and different absolute profits the
respective profit ratios are required. The profit ratio for the business sector as a
whole (19) has been directly derived from the profit definition (16) and is adapted
for a single firm as follows:
ρQA ≡ Q f iAWALA |t. (23)
Combining (20) and (10) one gets for the relative profit ratios:
ρQA
ρQB
=
PARA
WA
−1
PBRB
WB
−1
=
PARA
WA
−1
PARA
WB
−1
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (24)
If the (average) wage rates are equal the profitability of firms is equal in the com-
petitive structure as defined by (10). There is, though, no such thing as a “law”
of uniform profitability because there is nothing in the formalism that equalizes
the average wage rates between firms. For the classics (Mill, 2006a, p. 472) and
even more so for Walras (Morishima, 1977, pp. 82-83) profit equalization was
self-evident. Of course, a formal proof of overall dynamic profit equalization could
not be delivered. The classics simply added the principle of perfect competition
to the principle of self-interest (Dmitriev, 1986, pp. 134-135) wherefrom in due
time the general equilibrium emerged. If an equalizing mechanism exists it has to
be separately identified and consistently combined with the axiom set.
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5 The structural value theorem (II)
We now turn the question around and ask for the implications of equal profit ratios
in the general case of different wage rates. Eq. (23) can be rewritten for both firms:
ρQA ≡ ρEAYWALA −1
ρQB ≡ ρEBYWBLB −1
|t. (25)
Under the condition of equal profit ratios this yields:
WALA
WBLB
=
ρEA
ρEB
|t. (26)
Equalization demands that the weighted labor inputs must be in proportion to the
expenditure ratios. If wages rates are equal we are back at the initial condition for
the competitive structure (10). Eq. (26) is taken as the the general condition for the
competitive structure. Inserted in (7) the price relation in the competitive structure
by consequence is:
PA
PB
=
WA
RA
WB
RB
if
WALA
WBLB
=
ρEA
ρEB
and if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t.
(27)
The structural value theorem now states: relative prices are equal to the relation of
unit wage wage costs in the competitive structure. This is the benchmark case. If
wage rates are equal, then relative prices are equal to the inverse productivities as in
(10). In both cases the profit ratios are equal.
The relation (27) cannot be expressed in a real economy. It is, however, possible to
reformulate the weights in (26) as follows: WB = wBWA; this eliminates the different
wage rates in the condition of the competitive structure and gives the weighted labor
input L•B = wBLB. If WB > WA then LB simply gets a greater weight and we are
back at the real value theorem. The general condition for the competitive structure
is that weighted labor input, i.e. LA, L•B is allocated in the same proportion as the
expenditure ratios.
We therefore have two essentially different configurations: the arbitrary allocation
of labor input and the competitive structure. In this configuration labor is allocated
according to the household sector’s preferences and the profit ratios are equal
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between the firms. By translating the different wage rates into a weighting factor wB
the relation of unit wage costs of (27) turns into a weighted relation of productivities:
PA
PB
=
R•B
RA
if
LA
L•B
=
ρEA
ρEB
and if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 with WB = wBWA |t.
(28)
The point to emphasize is that in the perfect economic configuration all subjective
elements are eliminated. In the structural axiomatic context value depends alone on
weighted productivities. A change of preferences has no effect on relative prices
only on the allocation of labor input. That means, we have to rethink the accustomed
idea of the price mechanism.
Different profit ratios in different lines of production do not jeopardize the func-
tioning of the system as a whole but must be taken as empirical normality. The
market economy can exist for an indefinite time without equal profit ratios but not
with losses. This is the sine qua non. The economy needs an adequate margin
for erroneous decisions, counterproductive behavior, and all kinds of deviations
from the benchmark structure. The safety buffer that ensures a reasonable stability
is provided by profit. The structural precondition of a positive profit ratio for the
economy as a whole is given with (19). If the expenditure ratio ρE is unity and the
distributed profit ratio ρD is zero then the profit ratio for the business sector is zero.
If profit ratios are not equal in this zero-profit economy the profit of one firm is
equal to the loss of the other and this is not a comfortable situation over a longer
time span. The axiomatic theory of profit is obviously fundamentally different from
both Ricardo’s ‘Corn Theory of Profit’ (Dobb, 1973, p. 70), (Blaug, 1998, p. 86)
and Mill’s abstinence theory (Mill, 2006a, p. 481).
When market clearing, budget balancing, and the equalization of profit ratios is
assumed then the only subjectively chosen variable is the expenditure ratio for
one product. The rest of the system is in this case determined by objective con-
ditions. This economy deserves the predicate optimal because the partitioning of
consumption expenditures can always be interpreted as optimal. In the case of
budget balancing total profit is equal to distributed profit.
The optimal competitive structure can obviously be generalized for an arbitrary
number of firms and products. In marked contrast to the classical approach the
structural axiomatic approach asserts that a perfect competitive structure with all
desirable properties is possible but not that the economy will attain this state sooner
or later. This, though, is not a matter of primary concern. With regard to the proper
functioning of the market economy the critical condition is that the expenditure
ratio has to be greater than unity and/or the distributed profit ratio has to be greater
than zero because a zero-profit economy – Walras’s ‘Ni bénéfice ni perte’ – is not
reproducible with more than one firm (for details see 2011f, pp. 10-14).
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6 On profits
It is of utmost importance that profit Q f i and distributed profit YD is clearly distin-
guished. The latter is a flow of income from the business to the household sector
analogous to wage income. By contrast, profit is the difference of flows within the
business sector. Profit is not connected to a factor input. So far we have labor input
as the sole factor of production and wage income as the corresponding factor remu-
neration. Since for now the factor capital is nonexistent profit cannot be assigned
to it in functional terms. And since profit cannot be counted as factor income (cf.
Knight, 2006, p. 308-309, Schumpeter, 2008, p. 153) there is no place for it in the
theory of income distribution. To mix up income and profit is a category mistake
(for details see 2012).
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationship given by (18). On the firm’s
level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation or superior
management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for risk taking
or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic practices.
These factors play a role when it comes to the distribution of profits between
firms and these phenomena become visible when similar firms of an industry are
compared. Business does not ‘make’ profit; it redistributes profit. Because of this
it is not wise to take the individual firm as analytical starting-point and then to
generalize. The microeconomic approach is prone to the fallacy of composition.
The profit definition entails a cognitive dissonance between micro and macro, but
no logical contradiction. In the first place, that is, irrespective of the distribution
between individual firms total profit as a factor-independent residual (Ellerman,
1986, pp. 61-65) has nothing to do with price, costs, competition or any other factor
that is crucial to the individual firm’s management. The existence and magnitude of
total profit is not explicable by the marginal principle.
Under the condition ρE = 1 profit Q f i must, as a corollary of (18), be equal to
distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables is
not an issue in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit is
an implicit feature of equilibrium models and of general equilibrium theory in
particular (Patinkin, 1989, p. 329), (Buiter, 1980, pp. 3, 7). These approaches
cannot find a counterpart in reality because profit and distributed profit are never
equal. Models that are based on the collapsed definition total income ≡ wages +
profits (cf. Keynes, 1973, p. 23; Kaldor, 1956, p. 95) are a priori unacceptable
because profit and distributed profit is not the same thing.
The barter-economic notion of surplus stands in no relation to profit as determined
by (16). Neither is the neoclassical equilibrium condition, profit rate = marginal
productivity of capital, applicable in the pure consumption economy because we
have profit but no capital. And, since profit and capital must not be treated like
Siamese Twins, as they have by the classics, the tendency of the profit rate to fall is
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also in need of a thorough revision. Neither the classicals nor the neoclassicals ever
came to grips with profit (Desai, 2008, p. 10).
The simplest formula to express the relation between prices and cost of production
is:
price≥ cost of production per unit. (29)
The classical school rightly insisted on the view that production cannot continue
for long if the price does not cover the costs and based their value theory on this
incontestable fact (Dmitriev, 1986, p. 63). Neither vital necessity nor wishful
thinking, though, makes profit to appear and therefore this view cannot explain
why profits are in fact positive over a longer time span. When condition (29) is
reformulated in structural axiomatic terms and somewhat tightened to exclude zero
profits we get condition (i):
(i) ρF ≡ WPR < 1 ⇒ (ii) ρE (1+ρD)> 1 if ρX = 1. (30)
From the period core (6) then follows condition (ii) which states that the expenditure
ratio has to be greater than unity and/or that the distributed profit ratio has to be
greater than zero and this condition may be referred to as the life-formula of the
pure consumption economy. This formula implies credit growth, at least over some
initial periods. For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption
expenditures C have in the simplest case, i.e. ρD = 0, to be greater than wage
income YW . So that profit comes into existence in the pure consumption economy
the household sector must run at first a deficit. This in turn makes the inclusion of
the financial sector mandatory.3
It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit
generation appears more complex. This does not affect the nature of profit. It simply
removes the formal necessity that the households have to run a deficit to get the
economy going. This is then done by the investing firms.
7 The rate of interest
Profit, interest, and rent posed some intricate problems for the labor theory of value
(Vianello, 2010). We have dealt with profit above and now include interest. This
also gives a clue of how to deal axiomatically with rent which is not considered
further here (for details see 2011h).
3 The purchase of long lived consumption goods, e.g. houses, has to be subsumed under consumption
expenditures. With regard to collateral there arises no problem for the banking industry and a sound
credit expansion may – in principle – proceed for an indefinite time in the pure consumption economy.
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To simplify matters it is supposed that all financial transactions are carried out
without costs by the central bank. Money then takes the form of current deposits or
current overdrafts (for details see 2011e).
The central bank consists of two units, the transaction unit and the banking unit
that finances the households which in turn is the precondition for consumption
expenditures to be greater than income, i.e. for an expenditure ratio ρE > 1. The
output of the banking unit consists of the administrative services related to a certain
number of one-period loans as given by (44), which is reproduced here:
OB = RB LB |t. (31)
The output’s dimension is loans processed per period. With regard to the peculiari-
ties of the banking business it is formally necessary to relate the services to the value
of loans. With Aˆ, as specified by (32), the average value per loan of the existing
average stock of loans A¯ (which in turn follows from the cumulated overdrafts) is
denoted:
AˆB ≡ average value of stock of loansnumber of loans in stock ≡
A¯B
nS
[
EUR
loist
]
. (32)
Equation (31) is rewritten as:
OB AˆB =
(
RB AˆB
)
LB |t. (33)
The relation between the number of processed loans and the number of loans in the
banking unit’s books defines the stock-flow ratio ρn:
ρn ≡ OBnS

lo pro
period
lo ist
 ⇒ ρn ≡ 1[ 1period
]
if OB = nS. (34)
Here we make the simplifying assumption that the whole stock is processed in
each period which means that we make no distinction between new lending and the
administration of the already existing stock. In this case the ratio ρn reduces to one
and carries only a dimension.
From (33) in combination with (32) and (34) follows:
A¯Bρn︸ ︷︷ ︸
O?B
= RBAˆB︸ ︷︷ ︸
R?B
LB |t. (35)
The households’ expenditures (52) consist now also of interest payments to the
banking unit. The flow of services bought X is taken to be equal to the output O?B of
15
the banking unit. Under the condition of market clearing the expenditures are equal
to the interest payments:
CB ≡ PB XB ⇒ PBρn A¯B ≡ IB A¯B if ρXB = 1 |t. (36)
For the formal relation between the price PB and the rate of interest follows:
PBρn ≡ IB
[
1
period
]
. (37)
The rate of interest thereby inherits the role of the price.
If the production structure is competitive then for relative prices holds:
PA
PB
=
R?B
RA
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (38)
After the substitution of (29) relative prices, here the relation of product price P to
the rate of interest I, are finally given by:
PA
IB
=
RB
RA
AˆB
ρn
⇒ IB = RARB
(
ρn
Aˆ?B
)
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1, Aˆ?B ≡
AˆB
PA
|t.
(39)
The loan interest rate IB is equal to the ratio of the productivity in the consumption
goods producing firm A and of the productivity in the banking unit B. The latter
is weighted with the deflated average loan value. In the competitive structure the
interest rate is therefore equal to a relation of real variables. When the average loan
value AˆB and the price PA always move in step (as they do with perfect indexing of
the nominal value of the loans), there is no effect on the rate of interest other than
productivity changes. Inflation or deflation are of no consequence. Without perfect
lockstep, however, the rate of interest and the price are positively related:
IB =
(
RA
RB
ρn
AˆB
)
PA if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (40)
The loans are produced like any other good and the interest rate therefore truly
reflects the production conditions in the respective industries.
The two functions of the central bank, transaction on the one hand (which has been
assumed here to be costless) and the processing of one-period loans on the other,
are neatly separated. The banking unit is the conceptual nucleus of the commercial
banking industry and has eventually to be spun off from the central bank.
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The financial profit of the business sector as a whole in period t is derived from the
profit definition (17) and (36) as:
Q f i ≡ PAXA−WALA + IBA¯B−WBLB |t. (41)
In the competitive structure the banking unit’s profit ratio is equal to the production
firm’s profit ratio if the wage rates are equal. The banking unit earns its living like
any other firm.
The salient point is that the (loan) rate of interest is not some kind of reward for
abstinence or waiting but the price for the services of the banking unit. It is basically
not different from any other price that the households pay for any other goods and
services.
The classical school did not properly discriminate between the rate of interest and
the profit rate (Walras, 2010, p. 423) and maintained that profits are ‘an element
in Cost of Production, in so far as they are spread over unequal lengths of time’
(Mill, 2006a, p. 482). Profits are no costs of production as we have seen in Section
2 but interests can be when the business sector finances its operations with loans
from the central bank (for details see 2011i). These interests for the working capital
cancel out for the business sector as a whole and determine only the distribution
of profits between the production firms and the central bank. The classical notion
of profit, although erroneous from the vantage point of the structural axiom set,
is realistic given the circumstances at that time when the roles of entrepreneur,
owner, and financier fell into one (Blaug, 1998, p. 91). Nevertheless, the classics
applied only parochial realism which is the defining characteristic of partial analysis.
The classical capitalist’s roles have to be separated analytically and reconfigured
in the general axiomatic context. This has been done; what remains to be done
is, of course, the inclusion of ‘commodities made by machinery’. Without a full
understanding of the elementary consumption economy, though, there is no chance
of grasping the complexities of capital accumulation and their implications for the
theory of value (for details see 2011g).
8 Can it be true?
One of the most famous stories about Gauss depicts him measuring the
angles of the great triangle formed by the mountain peaks of Hohen-
hagen, Inselberg, and Brocken for evidence that the geometry of space
is non-Euclidean. (Brown, 2011, p. 565)
From the differentiated axiom set follows for the competitive structure that the
exchange ratio for two products is equal to the (weighted) inverse productivity ratio
(28). Since this statement has been deductively derived it is a theorem. A theorem
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is different from a law in that it does not make any deterministic claim about real
world phenomena. Thus the structural value theorem does not suggest that there
exist market ‘forces’ that make it inevitably true ‘in the long run’ or ‘on the average’.
Nevertheless, it may turn out to be applicable to the real world like the Pythagorean
Theorem.
First of all it is important to recall that we deal at the moment with a pure consump-
tion economy. That is: no taxes, no foreign trade, no investment goods industry, and
no secondary market for durable consumer goods (Ricardo’s rare statues and pecu-
liar wines; for details see 2011c). Second, the structural value theorem holds but for
the product market. In fact the theorem says nothing at all about the labor market,
therefore it is a matter of indifference whether the economy is in full employment or
not. It does not matter either whether the economy experiences inflation or deflation.
In the limiting case of the competitive structure the price relations reflect solely the
state of organization/technology in different lines of production.
The conditions for the application of the structural value theorem constitute an ideal
consumption economy and are plausible in this restricted domain. They allow for
the following conditional prediction. If the allocation of the labor input between
firms reflects the preferences of the consumers, as it ideally should with efficient
markets, then the price ratios of the products are equal to the (weighted) inverse
productivity ratios. If the preconditions are approximately realized then we should
observe a relatively stable price structure that reflects the productivity development
in different industries.4
Independently of this we should find that the general structural value theorem (14),
i.e.
ρP =
ρXB ρEA
ρXA ρEB ρL ρR
(42)
always holds exactly, that is, within the boundaries of measurement errors. In other
words, it holds by virtue of pure deduction. What does that mean?
For a general answer let us briefly return to the Pythagorean Theorem. With a known
baseline and two known angles one can calculate the unknown and not directly
measurable distance to the moon. In physics a theorem is used as a calculating
device (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 332). The usefulness of theorems is beyond
question.
The application of a theorem, however, implicitly introduces a new claim. The first
claim is that the Pythagorean Theorem is true1, i.e. formally correct. By applying
it to calculate the distance to the moon it is tacitly assumed that earth and moon
are located in Euclidean space which is quite another claim that may or may not
4 “Summarizing [the interrelations for Germany], we may conclude that relative productivity growth
is the most important determinant of relative price growth, where causality may run the other way as
well . . . , but there is no proportional relation between the variables.” (Rahmeyer, 1988, p. 229)
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be true2. While true1 refers to the axioms, true2 refers to reality (Rosenberg, 1994,
pp. 225-229). Only when the properties of the space that is formally given with the
axioms happen to be those of real space the calculation of the distance will yield
the correct result. By innocently applying the Pythagorean Theorem we therefore
implicitly make the really strong claim that the Euclidean axioms capture reality. If
this happens to be the case, and as far as we know it does (Penrose, 2007, pp. 21,
29), then true1 and true2 amalgamate to true0– ‘beyond all reasonable expectations’
(Wigner, 1979, p. 231); but see also (Velupillai, 2005).
Under the condition that the general structural value theorem (42) is true0 it can
readily be applied as a calculating device that enables valid inferences from known
facts to unknown facts. This process is cumulative.
9 Conclusion
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three objective= nonbehavioral axioms that comprise ten
measurable variables as groundwork for the formal reconstruction of the evolving
monetary economy.
The analytical priority claim of the structural axiomatic approach rests on the simple
fact that, since the structure that is given by the axiom set does not adapt to behavior,
behavior has to adapt to structure. If behavioral and structural logic are at odds
behavioral logic is conductive to frustrated plans and expectations. This is the
normal state of economic affairs.
The present paper has two parts. In the first, the logical interdependencies of the key
variables that formally embody the firm, the market, and the income distribution are
developed. In the second, the real world implications for the theory of value are
made explicit. The main results of the axiomatic inquiry are:
• From the differentiated structural axiom set follows the general structural
value theorem which is independent of behavioral hypotheses.
• The competitive production structure as a limiting case of the general struc-
tural value theorem is characterized by an allocation of total working hours in
exact proportion to the assignment of consumption expenditures to different
products and epitomizes the consumers’ optimum.
• Given a competitive structure, relative prices are in the simplest case equal to
the inverse ratio of productivities. This configuration is formally consistent
with both the marginalist theory of the consumer optimum and the classical
labour theory of value.
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• Given a competitive structure with different wage rates, relative prices are
equal to the weighted inverse ratio of productivities.
• The characteristic of the competitive structure is that the profit ratios are equal.
The profit ratio is different from the profit rate which is not defined in the
pure consumption economy.
• Profit is not attributable to capital in the pure consumption economy. Profit is
a factor independent residual that is determined by the expenditure ratio and
the distributed profit ratio.
• In the structural axiomatic context the (loan) rate of interest is not some
kind of reward for abstinence or waiting but the price for the loan processing
services of the banking system.
• Profit is no part of the costs of production as Mill maintained. The profit ratio
is qualitatively different from the rate of interest.
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Appendix: The differentiated axiom set
Differentiation of the axiom set (1) to (3) for period t:
Y =WALA +DANA +WBLB +DBNB (43)
OA = RALA OB = RBLB (44)
C = PAXA +PBXB (45)
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YWA ≡WALA YWB ≡WBLB (46)
YDA ≡ DANA YDB ≡ DBNB (47)
YA ≡ YWA +YDA YB ≡ YWB +YDB (48)
YW ≡ YWA +YWB (49)
YD ≡ YDA +YDB (50)
L≡ LA +LB (51)
CA ≡ PAXA CB ≡ PBXB (52)
ρEA ≡ CAY ρEB ≡
CB
Y
ρE ≡ CY ⇒ ρE ≡ ρEA +ρEB (53)
ρXA ≡ XAOA ρXB ≡
XB
OB
(54)
ρDA ≡ YDAYWA ρDB ≡
YDB
YWB
ρD ≡ YDYW (55)
ρFA ≡ WAPARA ρFB ≡
WB
PBRB
(56)
Axioms and definitions are consolidated to the period core for two firms:
ρFA
ρEA
ρXA
(1+ρDA)+ρFB
ρEB
ρXB
(1+ρDB) = 1 (57)
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